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CASE COMMENTS
holds that the single fact of being a larger purchaser establishes illegal
reciprocity potential and that such potential constitutes an antitrust
violation per se. It is somewhat doubtful whether the Allis-Chalmers
decision will be followed in light of the recent Northwests8 and
ITT 8 9 cases. But if Allis-Chalmers is followed extensively or applied
to situations where there is a mere possibility of reciprocity, its effect
will be to thwart many mergers which would otherwise have been
legitimate since the granting of preliminary injunctive relief nor-
mally causes acquiring companies to abandon their takeover plans.90
To avoid this consequence, courts should adhere to a higher standard
in demonstrating potential reciprocity than that espoused in Allis-
Chalmers before granting preliminary injunctive relief to deny the
consummation of a proposed conglomerate merger.
JERRALD J. R OEHL
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964:
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND UNION MEMBERSHIP
The Civil Rights of 19641 represents a massive attack on racial
discrimination. Title V11 2 prohibits discrimination in all aspects of
employment.3 Other titles aim to eliminate discrimination in voting,4
mUnited States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 3oi F. Supp. io66 (NJ). Ill. 1969).
"'United States v. International Tel. 8- Tel. Corp., So6 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn.
1969).
0°Cases cited note 75 supra.
'Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
242 U.S.C. § 2oooe (1964).
For discussions of the problem of minority employment and the role of Title
VII, see Cooksey, The Role of Law in Equal Employment Opportunity, 7 B.C.
IND. & Com. L. REV. 417 (1966); Gould, Seniority and the Black Worker: Reflections
on Quarles and Its Implications, 47 TExAs L. Rrv. lo39 (1969); Iill, The Role
of Law in Securing Equal Employment Opportunity: Legal Powers and Social
Change, 7 B.C. IND. 8: Com. L REv. 625 (1966); Morse, The Scope of Judicial Relief
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 46 TExAS L. REv. 516 (1967);
Rachlin, Title VII: Limitations and Qualifications, 7 B.C. IND. & COat. L. REv. 473
(1966); Rosen, The Law and Racial Discrimination in Employment, 53 CAL. L.
REV. 729 (1965); Schmidt, Title VII: Coverage and Comments, 7 B.C. IND. & COM.
L. REv. 459 (1966); Note, Title FIT, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent
Negro, 8o HARV. L. REv. 126o (1967); Note, The Civil Rights Act of x964: Racial
Discrimination by Labor Unions, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 58 (1966); Comment, En-
forcement of Fair Employment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 32 U. CHI. L.
REV. 430 (1965).
'42 U.S.C. § 2000f (1964).
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education,5 and public accommodations. Prior to the enactment of
this Act, certain restrictions had been placed on union conduct with
respect to the worker37 A limited duty of nondiscrimination was im-
posed, s although unions were still free to discriminate in their mem-
bership and admission policies.9 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 sped-
fically addresses this problem.
Title VII makes it unlawful for a labor union -to deny membership
to a worker, or act to deprive or limit his employment opportunities,
because of his race or color.' 0 When the Attorney General has reason
to suspect "a pattern or practice" of resistance to the enjoyment of
rights secured by Title VII, he may seek injunctive relief.'1 If the court
finds that the defendant has engaged in an unlawful employment
'42 U.S.C. § 2000C (1964).
042 U.S.C. § 2oooa (1964).
'See National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-67 (1964).
"In Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), a Negro fireman was
excluded from the Brotherhood of Locomotive Fireman and Enginemen. Although
exclusion from union membership was not illegal, the Supreme Court, interpreting
the Railway Labor Act, held that where a union is designated by a majority of the
workers as an appropriate bargaining agent, it must represent all workers, union
and nonunion alike, "without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in
good faith." Id. at 2o4. This duty of fair representation may require unions to
resist employer discrimination as well. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Jones, 229 F.2d 648,
65o (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 848 (1956). See Sovern, The National Labor
Relations Act and Racial Discriminations, 62 COLuTm. L. Ry-. 563 (1962). But see
Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 ViL. L. Rlv. 151 (1957). Conversely it is an
unfair labor practice for a union to cause an employer to discriminate against any
worker. 29 U.S.C. 15 8(b)(2) (1958).
The Civil Rights Act deals expressly with the problem of racial discrimination.
42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(c) (1964). Previous legislation has sought to protect the worker
as a general class and not specifically in terms of race. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-67 (1964).
9Congress in the National Labor Relations Act provided that:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(i) to restrain or coerce (A) employers in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in ... this title: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair
the -right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect
to the acquisition or retention of membership therein ....
29 U.S.C. § i5 8(b)(i) (1964).
'142 U.S.C. §§ 2oooe-2(c) (1964) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization-(1) to
exclude. . from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against, any
individual because of his race, color, ... (2) to limit, segregate, or classify its
membership, or... deprive any individual of employment opportunities,
... or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an appli-
cant for employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin ....
n42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-6(a) (1964). Title VII also provides for a civil remedy for
individual complainants. 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-5(e) (1964).
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practice, it may enjoin the offensive conduct, and "order such affirma-
tive action as may be appropriate."' 2
Title VII explicitly demands only nondiscrimination. The Act does
not require affirmative action to correct the present effects of past
discrimination.3 It is clear, however, that Congress did not intend to
freeze an entire generation of Negroes into patterns predicated upon
discriminatory practices that existed before the Act.1 4 The courts have
been confronted, therefore, with the dilemma of just how far they
may go in eliminating the vestiges of past discrimination. 15
The Attorney General may obtain relief only where a "pattern or
practice" of discrimination has been shown to exist.10 Yet Congress
did not establish the precise metes and bounds of the "pattern or prac-
tice" terminology.' 7 It has been left to the courts to develop this point
on a case by case basis. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in
United States v. Sheet Metal Workers, Local 36,18 was recently con-
fronted by this question. Although there was no evidence of discri-
minatory conduct since the effective date of the Act (July 2, 1965),
the court nevertheless found a prima facie "pattern or practice" of re-
sistance solely because of a racial imbalance in the composition of the
union.
In Sheet Metal Workers, the Attorney General charged the sheet
metal (local 36) and electrical workers (local I) unions with engaging
1242 U.S.C. § 2ooe 5(g) (1964).
"For an excellent discussion of the Act see B.N.A., THE CIVIL RIGHTS Acr OF
1964, TExT, ANALYSIS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1964).
"'Title VII represents in large measure a response to Congressional concern
over the depressed economic status of the Negro. See 1961 COMNIssION ON CIVIL
RIGHTI, REPORT: EMPLOYMENT 127; H.R. REP. No. 570, 88th Cong., 1st sess. 2-4
(1963).
'15n the voting rights field, Mr. Justice Black stated that "the Court has not
merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible
eliminate the discriminatory effect of the past as well as bar like discrimination in
the future." Louisiana v. United States, 38o U.S. 145, 154 (1965). The Supreme
Court was concerned with remedying the present effects of past conduct which
was unlawful at the time it was committed. In Title VII litigation where a court
is addressing conduct proscribed in the past, this approach would also seem
appropriate. However, the mandate of the Civil Rights Act is broader than that
of prior legislation, and a court may well be fashioning a decree to compensate
for past conduct not proscribed when committed. This would be the case with
regard to union membership and admission policies.
M42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-6(a) (1964).
21It is clear, however, that a "pattern or practice" is present only when the
denial of rights is repeated, routine, or of a generalized nature. Isolated incidents
of discrimination are left to correction by individual complainants. i10 CONG. REC.
14270 (1964).
11416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
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in a "pattern or practice" of discrimination against Negroes. At the
time of trial, local 36 had approximately 1275 journeymen members,
all of whom were white, and 116 apprentices, three of whom were
Negro. Local i had some 5060 members, of whom approximately 50
were Negroes. 19
The trial court found that both locals had excluded Negroes prior
to 1964, but that after the effective date of the Act (July 2, 1965) there
had been no instances of discrimination by either local.2 0 The court
concluded that:
[t]he Civil Rights Act of 1964 was not intended to penalize
unions or others for their sins prior to the effective date of the
Act. It is prospective only.... The Act specifically forbids a
union or a business from giving preferential treatment to
Negroes to correct an existing imbalance of whites.... There is
no pattern or practice of discrimination in this case since the
effective date of the Act.2 1
On appeal, the Attorney General argued that it was not necessary to
prove that a number of Negroes sought and were denied union mem-
bership or related benefits in order to establish a "pattern or practice"
of discrimination. The circuit court agreed, noting that when a large
labor organization in an area with a diverse population is found to
have no Negro members (or only a token number), and has standard
job requirements, the inference of discrimination is reasonable.22
The record did not indicate a number of instances of post-Act dis-
crimination. 23 But the court felt that such evidence was unnecessary,
since the record did show that Negro tradesmen were residents of the
area. In light of past union policies toward minority groups, the court
.thought it was unreasonable to expect that any Negro tradesmen
would seek to join either local.2 4
"Local 36 represents sheet metal workers in the construction industry in St.
Louis, Mo., and in forty-four surrounding counties. Local i represents electrical
workers in St. Louis, and twenty-four surrounding counties. 28o F. Supp. 719, 721,
724 (S.D. Mo. 1968).
2°United States v. Sheet Metal Workers, Local 36, 280 F. Supp. 719 (S.D. Mo.
1968).
2Id. at 730.
"416 F.2d at 127.
"The record was devoid of any instances of post-Act discrimination by local
36. There had been one qualified Negro who sought membership in local 1 and
had received evasive responses. The circuit court appears to suggest that this was an
incident of racial discrimination, although the opinion on this question is far
from clear. 416 F.2d at 128. Otherwise, there was no evidence of post-Act dis-
crimination by local 1.
mMoreover, the circuit court held that both locals had failed to adequately
publicize their abandonment of racially discriminatory policies and that they
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This holding represents a step beyond previous decisions. In the
past, courts have stressed the prospective nature of the Act and have
required that there be actual instances of discriminatory conduct after
July 2, 1965, in order to find a "pattern or practice" of discrimina-
tion.2  These decisions hold that the present consequences of past
discrimination cannot be remedied under the Act.
This was the approach taken in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 26 Prior
to the Act, Negroes were relegated to the labor department and denied
access to higher-paying departments. The complainant contended that
the company requirement of a high school education for departmental
transfer carried past discrimination into the present and thus violated
the Act. The court noted that the plaintiffs did in fact toil under the
inequities of past discrimination, but held that Congress intended the
Act to be given prospective application only. Since the Act, Negroes
had not been denied employment in other departments. Furthermore,
the education requirement had a legitimate business purpose and was
equally applicable to all employees. Without evidence of unfair em-
ployment practices since the Act, a finding of Title VII discrimina-
tion could not be made. Congress had faced the "cold hard facts of
past discrimination and the resulting inequities." 27 Realizing the
"practical impossibility of eradicating all the consequences of past
discrimination"2s the Act sought to eliminate the policies of discri-
mination which produced the inequities. The court would go no
further.
In Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW,29 a case involving issues similar
to those in Sheet Metal Workers, the Attorney General charged dis-
crimination with respect to membership. Local 212 had approximately
8oo journeymen, all of whom were white. The court found a number
of specific instances of union discrimination, and ordered relief with
respect to these. However, it rejected the government's contention that
Title VII required an all-white union to take affirmative action to
had an affirmative obligation to do so. The record dearly evidenced efforts in
this direction. Union representatives had appeared at predominantly Negro schools,
met with area high school counsellors, and issued newspaper, radio, and television
releases concerning opportunities in the building trades. The court held that
these efforts fell short of what was necessary. 416 F.2d at 137-40.
zDobbins v. Local 212, I.B.E.W., 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968); Griggt v.
Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243 (M.D.N.C. 1968); United States v. Sheet Metal
Workers, Local 36, 280 F. Supp. 719 (S.D. Mo. 1968)
'292 F Supp. 243 (M.D.N.C. 1968).
MId. at 248.
BId.
2292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
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remedy the present imbalance resulting from pre-Act discrimination.
The court noted that such action would constitute preferential treat-
ment, and Congress had specifically stated that Title VII should not
be construed to require a labor union to grant preferential treatment
to any group.3 0 The union was not required to seek out Negroes who
might be competent to become members.3' The only affirmative action
demanded was the posting on union premises of notices of nondiscri-
mination as required by the Act.
3 2
Nevertheless, some courts have endeavored to eliminate the pres-
ent consequences of past discrimination.33 However, in these cases
there has always been a readily identifiable class of discriminates. In
Local 53, Heat & Frost Workers v. Vogler,34 a number of Negroes had
been refused membership because the union excluded persons not
related to present members by blood or marriage. The court held that
while the nepotism requirement applied to black and white alike, and
was therefore not discriminatory on its face, the present effect of its
continued application in a union completely white as a result of past
discrimination, was to deny Negroes any real opportunity for mem-
bership. The court required the immediate admission of the discrimi-
nates, and ordered the development of objective, trade-related mem-
bership criteria and procedures.
However, the cases are unanimous in refusing to make assumptions
as to the presence of a class of discriminates.3 5 Thus, in Quarles v.
3042 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(J) (1964) reads:
Nothing contained in this title shall be interpreted to require any...
labor organization ... to grant preferential treatment to any individual
or to any group because of the race, color... of such individual or group
on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total
number or percentage of persons of any race, color... admitted to mem-
bership ... by any labor organization ... in comparison with the total
number or percentage of persons of such race, color.., in any community
... or other area, or in the available work force in any community... or
other area.
"Moreover, the court found nothing in Title VII that required the union
to publicize its policies with respect to membership or employment opportunities
to the public generally, or to the Negro community specifically. 292 F. Supp. at
447. In contrast the court in Sheet Metal Workers held that unions have an
affirmative obligation to do so. See note 21 supra.
=42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-1o (1964).
"Local 189, United Paper Workers v. United States, 416 F.2d 98o (5th Cir.
1969); Local 53, Heat & Frost Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969);
Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
"4o7 F.2d 1o47 (5th Cir. 1969).
"Dobbins v. Local 212, IB.E.W., 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968); United
States v. H. K. Porter, Co., 296 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ala. 1968); Quarles v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
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Philip Morris, Inc,3 6 the complainants pointed to the small number
of Negro supervisory employees in comparison with the larger num-
ber of white supervisors, and alleged that the company discriminated
with respect to employment and promotion of supervisory personnel.
The court refused to infer discrimination where there had been no in-
stances of a qualified Negro being denied employment or promotion
to a supervisory position.
In United States v. H.K. Porter Co. 3 7 the government sought the
abolition of departmental seniority and the creation of unrestricted
plantwide seniority and job bidding.38 The Attorney General relied on
numerical and percentage distributions of Negro and white employees
indicating that the majority of employees in low paying departments
were Negroes. Based on this evidence, the court held that an inference
of discrimination would be unreasonable because substantial oppor-
tunities of transfer, training, and progression were available to Negroes,
although few had taken advantage of the opportunities. Moreover,
the court required more than "speculation and arguments in briefs"3 9
before it would assume the experience needed for the proper and safe
performance of jobs in a steel mill.
In a similar context, Dobbins refused to make assumptions about
the qualifications for the electrician trade in the absence of some evi-
dence to sustain those assumptions. 40 The court noted that in some
fields a prima facie case of "pattern or practice" of discrimination is
established by showing that given rights are exercised only, or to a
greater extent, by whites, and that there is a substantial Negro popu-
lation in the area.41 However, the court underscored the fact that it
-79 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. x968).
'7296 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ala. 1968).
MwThe steel mill in H. K. Porter was divided into departments, within which
jobs were arranged in lines of progression. One moved up the ladder within his
department. When a job would open, the men in the slot below would bid for
that job. The man with the greatest seniority in the department would get the
job. Id. at 54-55.
The Attorney General argued that Negroes were locked in the low paying
departments. Therefore, he wanted them to be able to bid on any job opening
in the plant (not just in their department), and to compete on the basis of time
worked in the mill (rather than departmental seniority which they didn't have).
Id. at 64.
"2-96 F. Supp. at 68.
"'292 F. Supp. at 445.
"This is the approach taken in the jury discrimination cases. A showing that
Negroes constitute a substantial segment of the population, that some are
qualified to serve as jurors, and that none or a token number have been called
for jury service over an extended period of time is prima facie proof of discrimina-
tion. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282
(195)o; Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400
(1942); Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34 (5 th Cir. 1966).
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was dealing with a craft union and that there was "no such thing as
an 'instant electrician' . ... 42 To establish a prima fade case of class
discrimination, it would be necessary to prove the existence of a signi-
ficant number of the group with basic skills in the particular trade.
The court found no evidence of any significant number of competent
Negroes and concluded that "[n]o court should engage in assumptions
in such a field."
43
In light of these decisions it is evident that Sheet Metal Workers
stand apart. In each previous decision where a "pattern or practice"
of discrimination was found, a number of Negroes had been discri-
minated against after the effective date of the Act.44 In Sheet Metal
Workers this was not the case. Rather the court sought to remedy the
racial disproportion of the union, a present result of past discrimina-
tion. The court assumed the presence of a class of qualified Negroes
ready to join the craft union and inferred a "pattern or practice" of
discrimination.
In drawing an inference of discrimination because of the absence
of Negroes in the union and demanding affirmative action to correct
the racial imbalance, the court adopted an approach found in jury
discrimination cases. 45 Where statistics show a pattern of exclusion,40
or token inclusion,47 courts are hostile to the refusal to search out
qualified jurors. The law requires a fair cross section of the com-
munity on juries, and jury commissioners have the duty to become
acquainted with, and seek competent jury prospects from all signi-
ficantly identifiable elements of the community.
48
But courts should be careful in transposing the statistical technique
of the jury selection cases. 49 Jurors are conscripted, yet labor unions
'2292 F. Supp. at 445 n.15.
431d. at 446.
"Local 53, Heat 8& Frost Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969); Dob-
bins v. Local 212, I.B.E.W., 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968); Quarles v. Phillip
Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
15The circuit court noted the jury discrimination cases in support of its in-
ference of discrimination. 416 F.2d at 127 n.7.
"8 See cases cited note 38 supra.
'TSee Cassell v. Texas, 339 US. 282, 286-87 (1950).
4
81d. at 289; Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1, 12 (5th Cir. 1966).
4vThe courts' willingness to recognize a prima fade case of discrimination in
jury selection cases can be explained in part by the fact that the remedy usually
sought is the impeachment of a criminal verdict. The policy of assuring the
accused a fair trial would seem to outweigh other considerations. Also where a
general injunction is sought, less certainly in the proof would be necessary than
where affirmative action is the remedy desired. Note, An American Legal Dilemma-
Proof of Discrimination, 17 U. CHi. L. REv. 107, 124 (1949).
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have no apparatus to make qualified Negroes step forward. Further-
more, estimation of the number of Negroes that meet the relatively
simple standards imposed upon jurors is far easier than calculating
the number of Negroes competent to perform jobs of a certain degree
of difficulty5 °
Clearly the most persuasive approach the Attorney General can
take in proving the existence of discrimination is to point out a num-
ber of distinct acts of resistance, and then allege that these constitute
a "pattern or practice". 51 Moreover, when a number of Negroes have
been rejected for union membership, while whites have been admitted,
the fact that few, or no Negroes, are members may well afford a strong
inference of discrimination.5 2 It would be a reasonable assumption
that at least one of the Negroes would have been as well qualified as
one of the whites. But in Sheet Metal Workers there was no evidence
to lend validity to an inference of discrimination other than a showing
of racial imbalance in the union.53 The use of statistical probability to
infer the existence of a "pattern or practice" of resistance is therefore
less persuasive.
5 4
Moreover, the judicial approach found in Sheet Metal Workers
stands in opposition to the legislative history, and express language
1 California has a fair Employment Practices Statute similar to Title VII.
Nevertheless, the Attorney General of California has stated in a written opinion
that any work force composed solely of individuals of one race is prima fade
discriminatory. 43 OPs. CAL. ATr'Y. GEN. 200 (1964), as cited in 416 F.2d at 127 n.7.
mSee Comment, Enforcement of Fair Employment Under the Civil Rights Act
of z964, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 430, 450 (1965).
5-"he absolute absence of Negroes plus evidence of specific instances of ex-
clusion after the effective date of the act, has been held to constitute evidence
of a "pattern or practice" of resistance. Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Non-
sectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967).
51The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Alabama v. United States,
304 F.2d 583 (5 th Cir.) aff'd, 371 U.S. 37 (1962) (voting discrimination) said, how-
ever, that: "In the problem of racial discrimination, statistics often tell much,
and Courts listen." Id. at 586.
r Vhere possible variable factors are few in number, an inference of resistance
may be strong. The courts have, for example, relied heavily on statistical evidence
to find discrimination when a pattern of lower wages for Negro school teachers
than for white was established. Freeman v. County School Bd., 82 F. Supp. 167
(E.D. Va.), aff'd, 171 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1938); Davis v. Cook, 8o F. Supp. 443 (N.D.
Ga. 1948), reu'd on other grounds, 178 F.2d 595 (5 th Cir 1949). Similarly the NLRB
has found a strong inference of anti-union discrimination when the proportion
of union members laid off exceeded the proportion existing in the group from
which the selection was made. F. W. Woolworth Co., 25 N.L.R.B. 1362 (194o).
But in Sheet Metal Workers, it would seem that the court should have con-
sidered other factors, including the number of openings in the local during the
period in question, the number of qualified Negro applicants, and the number
of Negro applicants accepted or rejected, along with the statistical showing of
racial disproportion to support a valid inference of discrimination.
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of the Act. 5 Congress intended the operation of Title VII to be "pro-
spective, and not retrospective." 56 Thus, for example, if a labor union
is all white as a result of past discrimination, the Act simply requires
the union to fill future openings on a nondiscriminatory basis.
It was in response to fears that statistical evidence might be suffici-
ent to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, and that unions
would be required to achieve some sort of racial balance, that the
Senate added to the Act a provision expressly stating that Title VII
does not require preferential treatment for any group merely because
it is underrepresented in a particular union.57 Therefore, an explicit
attempt either to prefer a racial group or to maintain a racially balanc-
ed membership would involve a violation of Title VII, because such a
practice would require a union to admit or refuse to admit on the
basis of race.58 The Act clearly does not demand affirmative action such
as special training programs or recruitment practices to improve the
employment situation of any minority.5 9 The only affirmative action
demanded by the Act is the posting of notices of equal employment
opportunity. 60
Thus the decision reached in Sheet Metal Workers goes further
than prior decisions in demanding more than the letter of the law.
The court makes it dear that labor unions have an affirmative duty to
correct racial imbalance in their ranks. It would seem that a union
must, therefore, include a substantial number of Negroes or else risk
being judged to have discriminated against an unknown quantity of
Negro workers who have not even applied for membership.
If qualified Negroes are available and willing to join the local,
the union may have to resort to quota admissions to impress govern-
ment officials that they are not discriminating. Such a policy would
5See B.N.A., THE CIVIL RIGrrs Acr OF 1964, TEXT, ANALYSIS, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY (1964).
661o CONG. REc. 7213 (1964).
r742 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(j) (1964). In explaining Title VII Senator Humphrey told
the Senate that:
the proponents of this bill have carefully stated on numerous occasions
that title VII does not require ... any sort of racial balance.., by giving
preferential treatment to any individual or group. Since doubts have
persisted, subsection(j) is added to state this point expressly. This
subsection does not represent any change in the substance of the title.
It does state clearly and accurately what we have maintained all along
about the bill's intent and meaning.
110 CONG. REC. 12723 (1964).
5811O CONG. REG. 7207, 7213 (1964).
r042 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(J) (1964).
®42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-1o (1964).
